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TAKING OFF THE BLINDFOLD: AN END
TO IMPUNITY IN NIGERIA
9Many thought . . . that the horrors of the Second World War N
the camps, the cruelty, the exterminations, the Holocaust N
could never happen again. And yet they have. Our time has
shown us that /an’s QapaQity Lor evil Hnows no li/itsZ81
INTRODUCTION
ollowing the catastrophic terrorist attacks on September
11, 2001, the international community has witnessed an
expansion of terror groups depicting the jihadist ideology2 in cal-
culated regions.3 This trend has been acutely felt in the north-
western region of Africa and is confirmed by the increase in vio-
lent attaQHs /otivated by 9ethniQ, raQial, religiodusc, tribal, and
national ideologiesZ84 Nigeria, located in West Africa, has been
ranked the third most terrorized country in the world, according
to the 2015 Global Terrorism Index,5 whiQh reported that 9ter[
rorist attacks are much more lethal in Nigeria than any other
1. Kofi Annan, Advocating for an International Criminal Court, 21
FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 363, 366 (1997).
2. The Muslim religious clergy has not established an authoritative doc-
trine on jihad. The Arabic word 9jihad8 means to strive, to endeavor, and to
struggle. See M. Cherif Bassiouni, Evolving Approaches to Jihad: From Self-
Defense to Revolutionary and Regime-Change Political Violence, 8 CHI. J. INT’L
L. 119, 146 (2007). During the early stages of Islam, jihad represented a spir-
itual struggle to uphold the faith in a self-defense manner. Id. It was a basis
for conquest. See id. During the World Wars, Muslim fighters called for reli-
gious unity against colonialism and called for jihad. See id. Recently, violent
extremist groups have manipulated the meaning of jihad in a way that lacks
theological qualification. See id.
3. See Lauren B. O’Brien, The Evolution of Terrorism Since 9/11, 80 FBI
L. ENFORCEMENT BULL. 3 (Sept. 2011), https://leb.fbi.gov/2011/september/leb-
september-2011.
4. YONAHALEXANDER, TERRORISM INNORTHAFRICA AND THE SAHEL IN 2015,
at 6 (2016). Terror groups have successfully infiltrated North African countries
of their 9porous borders, vulnerable and corrupt central governments, under-
trained and underequipped armies and booming drug trades that provide a
steady source of income.8 Tom Hundley, A Country of Their Own, PULITZER
CENT. (Oct. 2, 2013), http://pulitzercenter.org/blog/this-week-africa-mali-ter-
rorism-malaria-united-states-russia-soviet-union-nuclear-energy-film.
5. Ranked ahead of Nigeria are Iraq and Afghanistan. The closest ranked
African country is Somalia at eight. Cletus Ukpong, Nigeria Now Third Most
Terrorized Country in the World7 Report, PREMIUM TIMES (Nov. 21, 2015),
http://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/headlines/193626-nigeria-now-third-
F
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QountryZ86 The Nigerian terror group, Boko Haram,7 which has
tormented the entire African continent, is responsible for the
majority of terrorist attacks in Nigeria.8 Their assaults include
kidnapping school children, attacking churches and government
buildings, and using children as suicide bombers.9 As a result of
these attacks, at least twenty thousand people have been killed,
and thousands more have been displaced from their homes.10
!reated by Usla/iQ preaQher, Moha//ed euseL,"oHo Hara/’s
/ission is to Qreate 9Vod’s Hingdo/ on earth through sharia
law811 and in accordance with the Qur’an.12 Since the killing of
its founder, however, Boko Haram has plotted to overthrow the
most-terrorized-country-in-the-world-report.html. In Nigeria, there were 662
terrorist attacks, 7,512 casualties, 2,246 injuries and 1,512 properties de-
stroyed. Id. Accordingly, Boko Haram was responsible for eight of the twenty
most fatal terrorist attacks in the world in 2014. Id. Another terror group in
Nigeria, the Fulani militants, killed approximately 1,229 people in Nigeria. Id.
6. Id.
7. Boko Haram’s leader, Mallam Sanni Umaru, has stated that Boko Ha-
ram does not mean: 9Western education is a sin.8 FREEDOM C. ONUOHA, AL
JAZEERA CTR. FOR STUDIES, BOKOHARAM: NIGERIA’S EXTREMIST ISLAMIC SECT 2
(Feb. 29, 2012). It actually means: 9Western civilization is forbidden.8 Id. The
difference is that the first interpretation suggests the terror group is opposed
to formal education coming from the West (which is false), while the second
interpretation affirms their belief in the supremacy of Islamic culture (it in-
cludes education, but not one determined by Western education). Id.
8. See generally id.
9. Mohsin Ali, Boko Haram Attacks, AL JAZEERA (May 07, 2017),
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/interactive/2017/01/map-boko-haram-at-
tacks-170116191820253.html.
10. See generally id.
11. Sharia, or Islamic law, is a religious set of principles based on the four
pillars of Islam: Qur’an (Islamic Holy text), the Sunna (teachings of the
Prophet Mohammed), the Ulama (religious scholars), and the Qiyas (case law).
See Pavani Thagirisa, Historical Perspective of the Sharia Project & A Cross-
Cultural and Self-Determination Approach to Resolving the Sharia Project in
Nigeria, 29 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 459, 478N86 (2003).
12. See Ryan Schmidt, Absence of Northern Nigeria’s Social Development
and the Rise of Boko Haram, 15 SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL’Y, no. 2, 2015, at
23 (describing the three unique characteristics of an 9Islamic movement8K
Umma, Dawa, and Jihad). The Umma attempts to unite all Muslims worldwide
and restore Islam as a leading force in the world. See id. Dawa and Jihad are
means to obtain Umma. Id. Dawa suggests that the means to fix Muslims so-
ciety is through community education and unity. See id. Jihad attempts to ac-
complish Umma through various tactical approaches, including violence.
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Nigerian government and establish an Islamic state in Nigeria,13
while speQiLiQally targeting 9Western eduQation814 and 9/odern
Qivili`ation815 beQause oL the group’s Lundamental belief that
Western education is contrary to Islam.16 Many have attributed
the "oHo Hara/ pheno/ena to Rigeria’s poor governanQe and
eroded economy, where the gap between its social elite and the
lower class has broadened.17 Children are often sent away by
their parents at young ages to live with Islamic clerics because
they are unable to provide for them.18 The clerics, however, teach
the/ about the <u’ran and then they are LorQed to go out and
beg for food. Under these extreme conditions, children often turn
to Boko Haram as they are promised food, shelter, and financial
security.19 By many, Boko Haram is seen as a way to escape pov-
erty.20
Thus Lar, 9"oHo Hara/’s Qa/paign oL violenQe has shattered
lives, spread fear, displaced millions and destroyed the social or-
der aQross Z Z Z RigeriaZ821 Boko Haram has also indiscriminately
targeted both Muslims and non-Muslims, attacking mosques
and Muslim-majority towns.22 It has justified its heinous crimes,
13. See Lere Amusan & Samuel Oyewole, Boko Haram Terrorism in Nige-
ria: A Reflection on the Failure of Democratic Containment, 33 POLITEIA, no. 1,
2014, at 41.
14. Ufo Okeke Uzodike & Benjamin Maiangwa, Boko Haram Terrorism in
Nigeria: Causal Factors and Central Problematic, 9 AFR. RENAISSANCE, no. 1,
2012, at 95.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Nigeria boasts a per capita income of $2,700 USD and a healthy gross
domestic product growth rate, yet Northern Nigeria has one of the poorest pop-
ulations in Nigeria, which happens to be the center of Boko Haram’s network.
Analysts suggest government officials embezzle and misappropriate funds in-
stead of developing these regions. See Jideofor Adibe, Explaining the Emer-
gence of Boko Haram, BROOKINGS (May 6, 2014), https://www.brook-
ings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2014/05/06/explaining-the-emergence-of-boko-ha-
ram/.
18. Charlotte Alfred, Why People Join Nigeria’s Boko Haram, HUFFINGTON
POST (Apr. 16, 2016, 2:31 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/boko-ha-
ram-recruitment-tactics_us_571265afe4b06f35cb6fc595 l.
19. See id.
20. See id.
21. Salem Soloman, Boko Haram: Terror Unmasked, VOICE AM. NEWS (Feb.
2017), http://projects.voanews.com/boko-haram-terror-unmasked/.
22. Boko Haram is responsible for at least eighteen thousand deaths since
2009. In 2014, Boko Haram was the world’s deadliest terror group, killing
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which include attacks on civilians, kidnappings of schoolchil-
dren, and /urders oL 9nonbelievers,8 in the na/e oL JihadZ23
As a result, the rise of Boko Haram has garnered international
concern.24 The U.N. chief humanitarian officer in the Sahel re-
gion of Africa proclaimed that Nigeria is the key to eradicating
Boko Haram, but the eradication process requires international
support and cooperation.25 Moreover, the United Nations Secu-
rity Council26 _97ZRZ :eQurity !ounQil8^ has Qonde/ned "oHo
Hara/’s terrorist aQts and stressed the need Lor international
cooperation to combat Boko Haram.27 On behalf of the U.N. Se-
Qurity !ounQil, !risti,n "arros Melet, !hile’s Per/anent ;epre[
sentative and President of the Council for the month of January
EXFB, denounQed "oHo Hara/’s attaQHs and eapressed deep Qon[
cern for its blatant violations of international humanitarian
law.28
To prosecute international humanitarian law crimes, the In-
ternational Criminal Court (ICC) was created with global juris-
diction to be a permanent judicial body for the international
6,644 people. Id. In 2015, it was the second-deadliest group, behind the Islamic
State. Id.
23. Id.
24. See generally International Community Must Join with Nigeria to Com-
bat Boko Haram in Sahel, INT’L PEACE INST. (Jan. 25, 2017),
https://www.ipinst.org/2017/01/toby-lanzer-on-nigeria-lake-chad#13.
25. See id.
26. The U.N. Security Council is an organ of the United Nations, whose pri-
mary responsibility is to maintain international peace and security. See About,
UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL, http://www.un.org/en/sc/about/ (last vis-
ited May 16, 2017).
27. See Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Al-Qaida Sanc-
tions Committee Adds Boko Haram to its Sanctions List, U.N. Press Release
SC/11410 (May 22, 2014).
28. U.N. President of the S.C., Statement, U.N. Doc. S/PRST/2015/4 (Jan.
19, 2015). The President of the U.N. Security Council condemned the suicide
bombings in Maiduguri, Borno State and Potiskum, Yobe State, which resulted
in the destruction of civilian homes and significant casualties. See id. The pres-
ident cited some of Boko Haram’s violations of international humanitarian law
including, violence against women and children, kidnappings, killings, hos-
tage-taking, rape, sexual slavery and violence, and the recruitment of children.
See id.
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community.29 The ratification of the Rome Statute of the Inter-
national Criminal Court30 _9;o/e :tatute8^ in F>>? Qreated the
ICC, whose purpose is to prosecute heinous acts, including
crimes against humanity, genocide, and war crimes through in-
ternational jurisprudence.31Almost twenty years later, however,
the legacy of the ICC has been marred by substantive and pro-
cedural deficiencies, which have led to minimal results in re-
gards to prosecutions,32 along with backlash and withdrawals
from African member states due to its history of investigating
African leaders.33 These LaQtors have eroded the U!!’s reputa[
tion in the international community, as it is now seen as an in-
effective mechanism to prosecute terrorists.
On November 18, 2010, the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) an-
nounced that it was conducting a preliminary investigation in
Nigeria after its office received over sixty complaints in connec-
tion with the country. 34 In 2012, the OTP flew to Nigeria to
29. What does the International Criminal Court do? BBC NEWS (June 25,
2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-11809908.
30. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 2187
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Rome Statute]. The Rome Statute establishes the ju-
risdictional borders, rules, and procedures and ensures extensive human
rights safeguards for individuals during the litigation process. The Rome Stat-
ute has 124 signatory nations; however, the United States declined to ratify
the treaty. See The States Parties to the Rome Statute, INT’L CRIM. CT.,
https://asp.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/asp/states%20parties/Pages/the%20states%20par-
ties%20to%20the%20rome%20statute.aspx (last visitedMay 24, 2017).
31. The ICC is the only permanent, treaty-based court with jurisdiction over
war crimes, crimes against humanity, crimes of aggression, and genocide. See
Rome Statute, supra note 30, art. 5, 6, 7, 8.
32. Since its creation, the ICC has formally investigated twenty-eight cases
and has only completed one. It has spent over one billion USD and produced
only few verdicts. See Amy Niang, International Criminal Court Politricks,
AFR. COUNTRY (Feb. 14, 2017), http://africasacountry.com/2017/02/interna-
tional-criminal-court-politricks/.
33. African leaders have criticized the ICC for being too 9Africa-focused8
and, as a result, has failed to prosecute crimes committed by Western govern-
ments. See id.
34. Preliminary Investigation: Nigeria, INT’L CRIM. CT., https://www.icc-
cpi.int/nigeria (last visited Mar. 27, 2017). Nigeria ratified the Rome Statute
on September 27, 2001, however, the Rome Statute went into effect on July 1,
2002, and therefore, the ICC only has jurisdiction over Rome Statute crimes
committed in Nigeria or by its nationals beginning on July 1, 2002. See id. Five
years after its initial investigation, the Prosecutor of the ICC, Fatou Bensouda,
issued a statement declaring that the ICC continues to gather information re-
garding violations of international humanitarian law, despite the ongoing es-
892 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 42:2
gather evidence and intel on the Boko Haram attacks.35 Shortly
after this trip, the OTP concluded that there was a reasonable
basis to conclude that, since 2009, Boko Haram has committed
crimes against humanity under Article 7(1)(a) of the Rome Stat-
ute.36 Pertaining to war crimes, the OTP concluded that there
was an armed conflict in Nigeria between the Nigerian military
and Boko Haram and it was going to continue with its investiga-
tion into possible war crimes violations, as well as crimes against
humanity.37 Almost seven years later, the OTP continues to
dwell upon the proper course of action while Nigerians suffer at
the hands of Boko Haram.38
Before the creation of the ICC, the U.N. Security Council suc-
cessfully created two ad hoc tribunals39Kthe International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY)40 and the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR)41Kwhose
calating violence in Nigeria. See Press Release, Office of the Prosecutor, State-
ment of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Fatou Bensouda
Following Reports of Escalating Violence in Nigeria (Jan. 20, 2015),
https://www.icc-cpi.int//Pages/item.aspx?name=otp-stat-20-01-2015.
35. ElSayed M. A. Amin, Mohamed E. Badar, Noelle Higgins, The Interna-
tional Criminal Court and the Nigerian Crisis: An Inquiry into the Boko Haram
Ideology and Practices from an Islamic Law Perspective, 3 INT’L HUM. RTS. L.
REV. 2 (2014).
36. See id.
37. See id.
38. See id.
39. See Christopher K. Penny, ‘No Justice, No Peace?’: A Political and Legal
Analysis of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 30
OTTAWAL.REV. 259, 266 (1998) (defining an ad hoc tribunal as an international
court created for a particular purpose).
40. The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY)
was established as an ad hoc tribunal to deal with war crimes that occurred
during the 1990s Balkan conflicts, in which thousands of civilians were mur-
dered, tortured, and sexually abused in detention camps. See About, UNITED
NATIONS INT’L CRIM. TRIB. FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, http://www.icty.org/en/about
(last visited Jan. 16, 2016). Those prosecuted by the ICTY included both high-
ranking political and military leaders. See id.
41. The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) was the second
ad hoc tribunal created by the U.N. Security Council and was established to
prosecute those responsible for genocide and other international humanitarian
crimes. See The ICTR in Brief, U.N. INT’LCRIM. TRIB. RWANDA, http://unictr.un-
mict.org/en/tribunal (last visited Jan. 16, 2016).
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mandates were to convict perpetrators of international humani-
tarian law in each respective country.42 The U.N. Security Coun-
cil established the ICTY to prosecute humanitarian crimes in the
former Yugoslavia after years of civil war, which was filled with
heinous acts by various heads of state, including, genocide, rape,
and torture.43 The U!Te 9spearheaded the shiLt Lro/ i/punity
to accountability8 by Qharging govern/ental leaders Lor these vi[
cious crimes, ultimately seeking justice for their victims.44
Through its prosecutions, the ICTY has also developed interna-
tional humanitarian law by interpreting and analyzing abstract
ambiguous multistate agreements and setting procedural and
substantive legal precedents.45
Using the ICTY as precedent, the U.N. Security Council estab-
lished the ICTR to prosecute violators of humanitarian law that
occurred in the 1994 Rwandan genocide.46 Amongst its victories,
the ICTR successfully prosecuted high-ranking individuals 47
42. See generally About, supra note 26; The ICTR in Brief, supra note 41.
43. Some of the notable cases tried by the ICTY include Prosecutor v. Tadi'
and Prosecutor v. Erdemovic. The Tadi' Qase established that Qri/es against
humanity did not have to derive from an international armed conflict. See Pros-
eQutor vZ Tadi', !ase RoZ UT-94-I-T, Opinion and Judgment (Int’l Crim. Trib.
for the former Yugoslavia May 7, 1997). In the Erdemovic case, the ICTY held
that a soldier cannot claim duress when charged with crimes against humanity
for killing innocent civilians. See Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, Case No. IT-96-22-
T (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the former Yugoslavia Nov. 29, 1996).
44. Lana Ljuboja, Justice in an Uncooperative World: ICTY and ICTR Fore-
shadow ICC Ineffectiveness, 32 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 767, 773 (2010). The emer-
gence of a 9more complete historical record of the conflict in the Balkans8 has
been an additional benefit of the ICTY. Id.
45. The ICTY was the first independent tribunal that established legal prec-
edent and expanded on the elements of genocide, enslavement, and crimes
against humanity. In addition, the ICTY developed procedural law for security
of states, guilty pleas, and affirmative defenses available to the accused. See
id. at 774.
46. See The ICTR in Brief, supra note 41.
47. Trials of state officials include the former prime minister of Rwanda,
Jean Kambanda, and former Rwandan mayor, Jean-Paul Akayesu, who were
both convicted of genocide. Ljuboja, supra note 44, at 775N76. One of the most
notable cases tried by the ICTR was Prosecutor v. Akayesu. Decided in 1998,
the Akayesu case marked the first conviction for genocide since the adoption of
the Geneva Convention in 1948. See Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-
4-T, Judgment (Sept. 2, 1998); see also Leila N. Sadat, The Legacy of the Inter-
national Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 1N19 (Wash. Univ. Legal Studies Re-
search Paper Series, Paper No. 12-09-05, 2012).
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and further developed international humanitarian law by hold-
ing that rape with the intent to destroy a specific group of people
constituted genocide.48
The success of the ICTY and ICTR were powerful catalysts in
the establishment of the ICC. Ratified on July 1, 2002, the ICC
became the permanent international judiciary for investigations
and prosecutions of international humanitarian crimes. Almost
twenty years later, however, the ICC has only issued thirty ar-
rest warrants, spent over $1.6 billion USD, and still lacks credi-
bility49 due to the absence of three permanent members of the
U.N. Security CouncilKChina, Russia, and the United StatesK
which have all refused to ratify the Rome Statute.50 Moreover,
#LriQan leaders have beQo/e sHeptiQal oL the U!!’s /otives and
as a result have withdrawn from the ICC because an overwhelm-
ing majority of its investigations have focused on African lead-
ers, leading to the Qourt’s di/inished legiti/aQyZ51
48. Aside from prosecutions, the ICTR has provided aid to the Rwandan
people. It has established the Witness and Victims Support Section, which pro-
vides protection services to all witnesses and victims called to testify. Moreo-
ver, the ICTR has arguably received the most multistate cooperation, including
states such as Tanzania, Cameroon, Kenya, Togo, Zambia, Mali, South Africa,
Belgium, the Netherlands, and the United States. See id. at 776.
49. The ICC has failed to prosecute incumbent heads of state who have vio-
lated humanitarian law. Instead, the ICC has targeted middlemen, whose
prosecution 9was simply a coda to their military and political defeat by their
enemies.8 Eugene Kontorovich, The International Criminal Court Gives Up on
Its Prosecution of Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta, NAT’L REV. (Sept. 15,
2014), http://www.nationalreview.com/article/387935/courts-collapse-eugene-
kontorovich. The lack of Member State cooperation is evident in the ICC’s in-
dictment against Sudan’s president, Omar al-Bashir, for the Darfur genocide,
which has not only been ignored by Sudan but also by other ICC Member
States that al-Bashir regularly visits without fear of arrest. Moreover, the ICC
has failed to secure the cooperation of Kenya, one of Africa’s democratic coun-
tries, in the prosecution of Kenyan president, Uhuru Kenyatta, for abetting
rape and murder during the 2007 Kenyan election. See id.
50. See id.
51. South Africa, Gambia, and Burundi have all decided to abandon the
ICC, and Kenya and Uganda are prime candidates to follow. Every state that
departs the ICC diminishes the court’s jurisdiction. Elders, an organization
made up of former world leaders, called for 9urgent reform,8 stating that 9the
perception in parts of Africa . . . [is that] the [ICC] is not impartial, and that
big powers who are not members apply double standards, is undermining its
credibility and effectiveness.8 Somini Sengupta, African Exits Threaten a
Court, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 27, 2016, at 10.
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Compared to the ICC, which has large gaps in its jurisdiction
due to its failure to attract large state participants, inefficient
investigative procedures, and alleged biases against the African
continent, the ICTY and the ICTR have successfully prosecuted
senior government officials, interpreted and established legal
precedent in international humanitarian law, and are recog-
nized by U.N. Member States as legitimate judicial bodies. As a
result, while the U.N. Security Council intended for the ICC to
build upon the ad hoc tribunals’ suQQess in proseQuting perpetra[
tors accused of egregious international humanitarian crimes,
the U.N. Security Council should instead create an ad hoc tribu-
nal in Nigeria to prosecute Boko Haram members rather than
rely on the ICC, which has failed to efficiently prosecute perpe-
trators. Doing so will hold Boko Harammembers accountable for
their crimes, bring justice to the Nigerian people, and further
develop international humanitarian law.
This Note will analyze the persistence and accomplishments of
the ICTY and ICTR in prosecuting international humanitarian
crimes and will suggest that the U.N. Security Council establish
a tribunal in Nigeria rather than rely on the ICC, which has be-
come an inviable force in policing international jurisprudence
and prosecuting violations of international law. Part I of this
Note will examine the development and growth of Boko Haram,
detailing some of its most gruesome acts. Part II will describe
the U!!’s develop/ent and its Llaws, inQluding its inability to try
cases in an efficient manner and its procedural and substantive
deficiencies. This Part will then compare and contrast the ICC
to the ICTY and ICTR, which successfully prosecuted perpetra-
tors in both the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. Finally, Part III
will recommend a preliminary strategy to prosecute Boko Ha-
ram members. This strategy includes promoting a campaign
against Boko Haram and creating a criminal tribunal in Nigeria.
Wirst, as one oL the world’s deadliest terrorist organi`ations, the
Boko Haram insurgency needs to garner more international sup-
port and cooperation. The international community, including
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and international state
agencies, must dedicate resources to promote campaigns sur-
rounding "oHo Hara/’s heinous acts and its victims to prevent
further Boko Haram expansion. In conjunction, the U.N. Secu-
rity Council should propose a resolution to create an ad hoc tri-
bunal, which would be binding on all its Member States and tai-
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lored to prosecuting individual violators of international human-
itarian law crimes committed by Boko Haram members, which
include crimes against humanity, genocide, and rape. This two-
step process will ensure that a strong judicial body will hold
Boko Haram members accountable and bring justice to the Ni-
gerian people.
I. BOKOHARAM’S REIGN OF TERROR INNIGERIA
This Part will eaa/ine the evolution oL "oHo Hara/’s e/er[
gence in Nigeria from a peaceful rebellion group to a vicious ter-
ror organi`ationZ Ut will analy`e the group’s origin and shifting
philosophies that align more with Islamic Extremism52 than
with Jihad, which is more of a spiritual movement and not a dec-
laration of war against other religions.53 In addition, this Part
will eaa/ine Rigeria’s politiQal Qorruption and the widening gap
between the social elite and the poor, which has enabled the or-
ganization to grow and develop.
52. Islamic extremism derives from an interpretation of Islam that believes
in a global Islamic state, which rejects Western philosophies and democracy.
See Ryan Mauro, Understanding Islamic Extremism, CLARION PROJECT,
https://clarionproject.org/understanding-islamist-extremism/ (last visited May
24, 2017); see also Bassiouni, supra note 2. For an examination of the differ-
ences between Jihad and Extremism, see Mohamed Elmenshawy, Jihadists vs.
=Ftremists9'hen Language 8atters, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 21, 2015),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/mohamed-elmenshawy/jihadists-vs-extrem-
ists-w_b_8851224.html. Extremists believe it is their obligation to spread sha-
ria law throughout the entire world, particularly in Muslim-dominated areas.
See id. A goal of extremists is to eradicate non-Muslim political and military
forces from their regions. Extremists often turn to terrorism, humanitarian
crimes, and propaganda against the West to brainwash recruits. See id. To be
clear, not all Islamic extremists participate in violent acts of terrorism. Most
Islamic extremists adopt nonviolent schemes, including fundraising, political
activism, and educating the public. See id. Conversely, Islamic terrorists rely
on violence and terrorism to establish power and instill fear in civilians to
achieve their purpose. See id.
53. See Elmenshawy, supra note 52.
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A. Emergence of Boko Haram in Nigeria
Boko Haram54was founded in theMuslim-dominated northern
region of Nigeria by a Sunni55 cleric, Mohammed Yusuf, in
2002.56 Described as a charismatic leader, Yusuf followed a
striQt, Lunda/entalist interpretation oL the <ur’an and believed
that the Qreation oL Rigeria i/posed an inappropriate 9Western
liLestyleZ857 Yusuf created his own mosque and Islamic school
with the hopes that his followers would abandon Western edu-
cation as well.58 In his sermons, Yusuf was critical of the Nige-
rian government and wanted to establish an Islamic state in Ni-
geria with the implementation of sharia law.59 His message ul-
timately resonated in poorer regions of Nigeria, where high rates
of unemployment and poverty were commonplace and where
youths were frustrated with their way of life, making them sus-
ceptible to extremism.60
54. The group refers to themselves as Jama’atu Ahl as-Sunnah Li-Da’awati
wal-Jihad. Boko Haram: Abubakar Shekau Reappears Again After ISIS Name
His Successor, Claims He was Deceived, SAHARA REP. (Aug. 3, 2016), boko-ha-
ram-abubakar-shekau-reappears-again-after-isis-named-his-successor-
claims-he-was.
55. Sunni and Shia comprise the two major sects of Islam. See Sunnis and
Shia: Islam’s Ancient Schism, BBC NEWS (Jan. 4, 2016),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-16047709. Approximately 85N90
percent of Muslims are Sunnis, whereas about 10 percent of the total Muslim
population is Shia. Id. These two sects recognize a multitude of fundamental
beliefs but differ in doctrine, ritual, and practices. See generally id.
56. See Who are Nigeria’s Boko Haram Islamist Group?, BBC News, (Nov.
24, 2016), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-13809501.
57. See id.
58. Boko Haram has specifically targeted students and public officials be-
cause it opposes Western philosophies and teachings. David Stout, Four
Things You Need to Know About Nigeria’s Boko Haram, TIME (Sept. 30, 2013),
http://world.time.com/2013/09/30/four-things-you-need-to-know-about-nige-
rias-boko-haram/. The terror group views Western education as a toxin to the
mind and targets students and officers in its battle to establish a caliphate,
which is a form of government led by a caliph that is regarded as a successor
to the Islamic prophet Muhammad. See id.
59. See id.
60. Freedom C. Onuoha, Why do Youth Join Boko Haram? U.S. INST. OF
PEACE, June 2014, at 5.
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Eventually Boko Haram members isolated themselves from
society and lived peacefully in a community dedicated to practic-
ing sharia law.61 The community offered refugees shelter, job op-
portunities, food, and essentials for anyone that wanted to ac-
cept sharia law.62 At one point, Boko Haram successfully oper-
ated its own government, harvested food from its own farms, and
even maintained its own police force.63
Although radical, Boko Haram did not become violent until
2009, when its members refused to obey a law requiring motor-
cycle riders to wear helmets, claiming the law was un-Islamic.64
The refusal to obey the law resulted in the arrest of several mem-
bers, which spawned a riot that left over eight hundred people
dead.65 Subsequent to the riot, Yusuf was detained and interro-
gated by Nigerian forces.66 After his interrogation, he was exe-
Quted without trial, and the video Lootage oL eusuL’s eatraJudiQial
murder went viral and was used as a recruitment tool.67
Since the execution of Yusuf, Boko Haram has evolved into a
terrorist organization, engaging in guerrilla warfare, abduc-
tions, assassinations, and suicide bombings.68 The group’s
growth, however, can be attributed to social underdevelopment
and political corruption.69
61. See Jenna McLaughlin, Group That Kidnapped 200 Nigerian Girls
Started Out Peaceful. Here’s What Changed, MOTHER JONES (Jan. 16, 2015),
http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2015/01/was-boko-haram-peaceful-
group-violence.
62. See id.
63. See id.
64. See id.
65. See id.
66. See id.
67. SeeMcLaughlin, supra note 61.
68. See id.
69. See Heidi Schultz, Nigeria’s Boko Haram: Who Are They and What Do
They Want?, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC (May 8, 2014), http://news.nationalgeo-
graphic.com/news/2014/05/140507-boko-haram-nigeria-borno-state-maidu-
guri-mohammed-yusuf-abubukar-shekau-goodluck-jonathan-world. In 2012,
approximately 112 million Nigerians lived on less than one dollar per day. See
Nigerians Living in Poverty Rise to Nearly 61%, BBC NEWS (Feb. 13, 2012),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-17015873. Poverty makes people vul-
nerable to terrorism, and, as such, terror groups often recruit from this pool.
See generally Binneh Minteh & Ashlie Perrie, Presentation at the Mid-West
Political Science Association’s Annual Conference, Terrorism in West AfricaK
Boko Haram’s Evolution, Strategy and Affiliations (2013); Nnamdi Obasi. Ni-
geria’s Faltering Response Emboldens Boko Haram, AL JAZEERA AM. (Jan. 31,
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According to the International Fund for Agricultural Develop-
ment (IFAD), Nigeria is ranked as one of the twenty poorest
countries in the world, with over seventy percent of the popula-
tion being classified as poor, and is also ranked as the most cor-
rupt nation in the world.70 A leading factor to the demise of Ni-
geria’s eQono/y has been oilZ71 Soon after Nigeria began export-
ing oil, the government marginalized non-oil producing regions,
pushing those economies into depression. For example, in the
non-oil producing town of Borno, forty-six percent of boys are lit-
erate, compared to the oil producing state of Imo, where the lit-
eracy rate for boys is above ninety-eight percent.72 Boko Haram
was able to successfully capitalize on the underdevelopment by
offering financial support to these struggling regions in return
for their allegiance.73
Moreover, Nigeria has suffered from years of government cor-
ruptionZ Wor eaa/ple, several oL Rigeria’s high-ranking govern-
ment officials were accused and tried for stealing large sums of
money from the military.74 :a/bo fasuHi, Rigeria’s Lor/er se[
curity advisor stole two billion dollars in addition to bulletproof
cars and assault rifles.75 Furthermore, in 2012, two Nigerian
2015), http://america.aljazeera.com/opinions/2015/1/nigerias-faltering-re-
sponse-emboldens-boko-haram.html. There are three main reasons that ex-
plain Nigeria’s inability to contain Boko Haram. First, according to Al Jazeera,
the Nigerian government has been 9poorly informed, never grasp[ed] the grav-
ity of the threat and failed to provide consistent and coherent policy guidance
to drive an effective counterinsurgency.8 Obasi, supra note 69. Second, the mil-
itary is ill equipped to battle the terror group, saying the military is not trained
to fight an insurgency. See id. Lastly, it is reported that the battle against Boko
Haram is handicapped by regional disagreements, centered on whether an in-
ternational coalition should lead the battle or whether it should be led by Ni-
geria. See id. Furthermore, corruption in the government and military has im-
peded the country’s ability to fight Boko Haram. See id. For example, corrupt
officials are dedicating few budgetary resources to fight the terror group. See
id.
70. Press Release, IFAD, IFAD President Visiting Nigeria, Press release
IFAD45/01 (Dec. 7, 2001).
71. Id.
72. Hilary Matfes, Here’s Why So Many People Join Boko Haram, Despite
its Notorious Violence, WASH. POST (Apr. 26, 2016), https://www.washing-
tonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/04/26/heres-why-so-many-people-
join-boko-haram-despite-its-notorious-violence/?utm_term=.fc472d1b2883.
73. Id.
74. Nigeria’s Sambo Dasuki charged over ‘$68m fraud’, BBCNEWS (Dec. 14,
2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-35093785.
75. Id.
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government officials were charged with negligence and conspir-
acy in the escape of a prominent Boko Haram leader.76
These abysmal conditions in Nigeria, from government corrup-
tion and eroded economy to high illiteracy rates has hamstrung
Rigeria’s develop/ent and given "oHo Hara/ a saLe harbor to
operate as it lacks the resources to effectively neutralize the or-
ganization.
B. Boko Haram’s Reign of Terror
:ubse*uent to eusuL’s eaeQution in EXX>,77 Abubakar Shekau,
the new leader of Boko Haram, staged a campaign of terrorist
attacks against schools, government buildings, churches, and
villages, amongst others.78 Shekau embraced violence as a sign
of oppression against the Nigerian government and against an-
yone that threatened the group’s obJeQtive oL establishing sharia
law.79 Due to the immense growth and destruction caused by the
terror group, Boko Haram was designated as a Foreign Terrorist
Organization by the U.S. State Department in 2003, which trig-
gers automatic sanctions against the group and criminal penal-
ties for supporters of the group.80
76. There have been hundreds of extrajudicial killings and public executions
by Nigerian police that were uninvestigated by the Nigerian government. For-
mer president of Nigeria, Olusegun Obasanjo, criticized the National Assembly
police, calling them 9rogues and armed robbers.8 See McLaughlin, supra note
61. Moreover, Nigerian political officials have been accused of embezzling a
significant portion of the national budgets. See id.
77. See CORINA SIMONELLI ET AL., BACKGROUND REPORT: BOKO HARAM
RECENT ATTACKS 6 (2014), https://www.start.umd.edu/pubs/STARTBack-
groundReport_BokoHaramRecentAttacks_May2014_0.pdf.
78. Boko Haram’s highest percentage of targets are private citizens and
their property (twenty-five percent), followed by the police (twenty-two per-
cent), and then the government (eleven percent). Id. at 3.
79. See id.
80. To be designated a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO), an organiza-
tion must be: foreign, engage in terrorist activity, and the terrorist activity
must threaten the security of U.S. nationals or national security. FTO desig-
nation halts any funding to the organization or people associated with it. See
Glenn Kessler, Boko Haram: Inside the State Department Debate over the ‘Ter-
rorist Label,’ WASH. POST (May 19, 2014), https://www.washing-
tonpost.com/news/fact-checker/wp/2014/05/19/boko-haram-inside-the-state-
department-debate-over-the-terrorist-label/?utm_term=.8307ee7a452b. Boko
Haram is ranked ahead of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS) for
deadliest terror group. In 2014, Boko Haram was responsible for 6,664 deaths,
almost six hundred more deaths than those caused by ISIS. Dionne Searcey &
Marc Santora, Boko Haram Tops ISIS in Ranking Terror Groups, N.Y. TIMES,
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In August 2011, Boko Haram attacked the U.N. headquarters
in the Nigerian capital of Abuja, killing twenty-five civilians.81
A suicide bomber detonated a vehicle filled with explosives,
which was parked outside the U.N. headquarters, demolishing
parts of the building.82 Celebrating its accomplishment, Boko
Haram member, Abu Kakah, called the news station, BBC, in
northern Nigeria to boast about the attacks and stated that its
goal was to convert the entire region to sharia law.83 According
to Kakah, Boko Haram considered the United States84 and the
United Nations common enemies because they supported the Ni-
gerian government, who continued to infringe on Muslim rights,
and vowed to continue the attacks.85 Shortly afterward, a Nige-
rian government official, Viola Onwuliri, proclaimed that Boko
Haram was at war with the entire international community.86
:ubse*uently, "oHo Hara/’s attacks have increased in military
sophistication, including the use of improvised explosive devices
and the execution of coordinated cross-border raids and kidnap-
pings.87
Nov. 19, 2015, at A6. Together with ISIS, the two groups account for almost
half of all the international deaths caused by terrorism. See id. In 2014, there
was a 300 percent increase in the deaths caused by Boko Haram. See id.
81. See Senan Murray & Adam Noissiter, Nigeria Shaken by Suicide Attack
on United Nations Building, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 27, 2011), at A4.
82. See id.
83. See id.
84. The Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence of the House
Committee on Homeland Security cautioned the United States not to underes-
timate Boko Haram’s ability to carry out an international attack. See Boko Ha-
ram 7 Emerging Threat to the U.S. Homeland: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Counterterrorism and Intelligence of the H. Comm. on Homeland Sec., 112th
Cong. 1N24 (2011). History has shown that underestimating the capabilities of
terror groups has backfired. Recently, the intelligence community was caught
off-guard when Al Qaeda and the Taliban carried out attacks against the
United States. See id. Prior to their attacks, both were deemed to be domestic
terror cells. See id.
85. See IbrahimMshelizza, Islamist Sect Boko HaramClaims Nigerian U.N.
Bombing, REUTERS (Aug. 29, 2011), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-nigeria-
bombing-claim-idUSTRE77S3ZO20110829.
86. See id.
87. The increase in sophistication of Boko Haram’s attacks has caused con-
cerns that the terror group is receiving funding from Al Qaeda and other mili-
tant groups. See Boko Haram, STAN. U., http://web.stanford.edu/group/map-
pingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/553?highlight=boko+haram (last visited
May 24, 2017); see also Boko Haram Time: From Preachers to Slave Raiders,
BBC NEWS (May 15, 2013), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-22538888
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"oHo Hara/’s deadliest attaQH, however, oQQurred in Tanuary
2015 when it ransacked and terrorized the town of Baga, Nige-
ria.88 Over a period of days, militants torched the entire town
after raiding the village and massacring approximately two
thousand civilians.89 Out of approximately 3,700 structures that
were ruined, 620 structures were decimated in the region of
Baga, and more than three thousand were destroyed in Doron
Baga.90
Further, since May 2011, there have been over fifteen thou-
sand Boko Haram-related deaths that have been recorded by
media outlets,91 and the group continues to use its gruesome as-
saults to generate fear in Nigeria.92 Aside from suicide bombings
and mass murders, the terror group has also sieged schools and
kidnapped schoolchildren to symbolize its opposition to Western
education, particularly with respect to young girls.93 For exam-
ple, in April 2014, in the Nigerian town of Chibok, Boko Haram
militants raided an all-girls school and abducted 276 students,
(discussing Boko Haram’s evolution). Currently, however, Boko Haram re-
ceives most of its funding from looting, extortion, and ransoms from kidnap-
pings.
88. See Nigeria’s Boko Haram: Baga Destruction ‘Shown in Images,’ BBC
NEWS (Jan. 15, 2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-30826582 [here-
inafter Nigeria’s Boko Haram: Baga Destruction].
89. Reports indicate that most victims were children, women, and elderly
people who could not escape the insurgents. See Monica Mark, Boko Haram’s
‘Deadliest Massacre’: 2,000 Feared Dead in Nigeria, GUARDIAN (Jan. 10, 2015),
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jan/09/boko-haram-deadliest-massa-
cre-baga-nigeria. Prior to the Bagga attack, the second deadliest attack carried
out by Boko Haram occurred in the city of Maiduguri, where Boko Harammas-
sacred six hundred civilians. See id.
90. See Nigeria’s Boko Haram: Baga Destruction, supra note 88 (describing
the satellite images showing 9devastation of catastrophic proportions in two
towns, one of which was almost wiped off the map8).
91. This is a conservative estimate based on the number of deaths reported
by the media. See John Campbell, Nigeria Security Tracker, COUNCIL ON
FOREIGN REL. (Nov. 15, 2012), http://www.cfr.org/nigeria/nigeria-security-
tracker/p29483.
92. See The Nigerian City Living in Fear of Boko Haram, BBC NEWS (June
27, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-28014260 (9[The Nigerian
peoples’] greatest worry is for the people in the villages, who are being killed
like antsKinnocent people who are being murdered day and night.8).
93. See Don Melvin, Boko Haram Kidnapping of 200 Nigerian Schoolgirls,
a Year Later, CNN (Apr. 14, 2015), http://www.cnn.com/2015/04/14/africa/nige-
ria-kidnapping-anniversary/.
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who were held captive by the group.94 Recently, in 2017, the Ni-
gerian government was able to free eighty-two of the school girls
by negotiating a prisoner swap with Boko Haram.95 Yet, more
than 150 children remain in captivity.96 Similar atrocities con-
tinue to occur daily, and, in total, at least two thousand women,
girls, and boys have been kidnapped by Boko Haram since
2014.97 As a result, approximately one million children have fled
their homes in fear of the terror group.98
Despite having its base in a poverty-ridden region of Nigeria,
Boko Haram also boasts limitless artillery that it uses to carry
out its heinous acts.99 Boko Haram has benefited from black
market dealings and funding from other terror organizations, in-
cluding al-Qaeda and al-Shabaab.100 Boko Haram has also ben-
efitted financially through abductions, whereby they sell slaves
94. See id.
95. See Kristine Phillips, Some Chibok schoolgirls are now free—but hun-
dreds more abducted by Boko Haram are still missing, WASH. POST (May 7,
2017), https://www.washing-
tonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2017/05/07/some-chibok-schoolgirls-are-
now-free-but-hundreds-more-abducted-by-boko-haram-are-still-miss-
ing/?utm_term=.407f5a51d414.
96. See id.
97. See Boko Haram Kidnappings: 1 Year Later, Still No Sign of the School-
girls, CBC NEWS (Apr. 14, 2015), http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/boko-haram-
kidnappings-1-year-later-still-no-sign-of-the-schoolgirls-1.3031789.
98. The conflict with Boko Haram has forced more than one million children
to stop attending school and has closed over two thousand schools in Northern
Nigeria and neighboring regions. See Melvin, supra note 93; Yinka Ibukun,
Boko HaramWar Forces aMillion Children from School, UN Says, BLOOMBERG
(Dec. 22, 2015), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-12-22/boko-ha-
ram-war-forces-a-million-children-from-school-un-says. Caught in the cross-
hairs of battle, children are afraid to attend school while Boko Haram carries
on with its battle against Western education. See Ibukun, supra note 98.
99. See Terrence McCoy, This is how Boko Haram Funds its Evil, WASH.
POST (June 6, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-
mix/wp/2014/06/06/this-is-how-boko-haram-funds-its-
evil/?utm_term=.15eb81d10520.
100. See id. Boko Haram previously affiliated itself with a terror group in
North Africa called 9Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb,8 which trained Boko
Haram members and financed its first suicide bombings in 2011. Peter Pham,
Boko Haram’s Pledge of Allegiance to ISIS: What It Means, CNN (Mar. 10,
2015), http://www.cnn.com/2015/03/10/intl_tv/pham-boko-haram-isis/. Moreo-
ver, the terror group has merged with ISIS, sharing the ideology of inhumane
civilian torture. See id. Boko Haram has also received financial aid and tech-
nological improvements from its alliance with ISIS. See id.
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on the black market101 and hold hostages for ransom to raise cap-
ital.102 Furthermore, the organization has also raided banks103
and engaged in gun smuggling to fund its enterprise.104 Using
illegal methods to fund its operation and its penchant for deadly
attacks, Boko Haram remains one of the most deadliest terror
organizations in the world.105
II. GLOBALGOVERNANCE BY THE ICC HAS BACKFIRED, DESPITE
PREVIOUS SUCCESSES OF THE ICTR AND ICTY
In 1997, U.N. Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, stated that
9peaQe and JustiQe are indivisibleZ Z Z Z dTche International Crim-
inal Court is the symbol of our highest hopes for this unity of
peaQe and JustiQeZ8106 For decades, the United Nations has docu-
mented the need for an international forum to prosecute inter-
national crimes.107 Subsequently, in 2002, the ICC Statute was
ratified, which vested the court with global jurisdiction to pros-
ecute heinous international crimes, including genocide, war
crimes, and crimes against humanity.108 The ICC, unfortu-
nately, has enjoyed limited success, spending over $1 billion
USD and convicting only two individuals since its inception,
101. SeeMcCoy, supra note 99.
102. See Farouk Chothia, Boko Haram Crisis: How have Nigeria’s Militants
Become so Strong?, BBC NEWS (Jan. 26, 2015),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-30933860 (noting that U.S. officials es-
timate that Boko Haram is paid millions of dollars in ransom for the release of
wealthy Nigerian hostages); see also David Blair, Nigeria’s Boko Haram isn’t
just Kidnapping Girls: It’s Enslaving Them, TELEGRAPH (Jan. 13, 2015),
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/women/womens-life/11342879/Nigerias-Boko-Ha-
ram-isnt-just-kidnapping-girls-its-enslaving-them.html.
103. See Chothia, supra note 102 (stating that Boko Haram often loots banks
when it raids towns).
104. Boko Haram has raided police stations and military bases, capturing
artillery, including armored carriers, pickup trucks, rocket-propelled grenades,
and guns. See Chothia, supra note 102. Sources indicate that Boko Haram has
formed strong relationships with sellers on the black market, particularly in
Libya, gaining access to weapons fromMuammar Gaddafi’s regime until it was
overthrown in 2011. Id.
105. See id.
106. Press Release, Secretary-General, International Criminal Court Prom-
ises Universal Justice, Secretary-General Tells International Bar Association,
U.N. Press Release SG/SM/6257 (June 12, 1997).
107. See id.
108. See William W. Burke-White, Proactive Complementarity: The Interna-
tional Criminal Court and National Courts in the Rome System of Interna-
tional Justice, 49 HARV. INT’L L.J. 53 (2008).
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while also facing coordinated withdrawals by African Member
States, leading to a diminished legitimacy of the court within the
international community.109 Previous ad hoc tribunals, like the
ICTR and the ICTY, which paved the way for the creation of the
ICC, however, have effectively prosecuted individuals for violat-
ing international humanitarian crimes.110 This Part will analyze
the U!!’s Qreation and its downLalls and will Qo/pare its suQ[
cesses as an adjudicative body to the ICTR and the ICTY.
A. ICC
During the first half of the twentieth century there was a myr-
iad of crimes against humanity. According to historians, during
this time period, approximately 170 million civilians were sub-
ject to genocide, rape, and crimes against humanity in places
such as Russia, the Congo, Germany, Vietnam, and Chile
(amongst many others).111 Formally recognizing these horrors,
in 1948, the U.N. General Assembly passed Resolution 260,
whiQh stated that 9to liberate /anHind Lrom such an odious
scourge [such as crimes against humanity, genocide, and rape],
international co-operation is re*uiredZ8112 Moreover, the U.N.
General Assembly concluded that the creation of an interna-
tional criminal court was both possible and advantageous to-
109. Id. at 54 (noting that, whereas the preamble to the Rome Statute antic-
ipates the court 96putting an end to impunity for the perpetrators of . . . [inter-
national] crimes,’ the capacity of the court and the limited resources made
available to it suggest that it will, at best, make a far more limited contribution
to ending impunity8).
110. The ICTY and the ICTR have demonstrated that international prosecu-
tion and comity are effective and are viable solutions to combat violations of
international humanitarian law. Both tribunals have also added substantive
precedent to international humanitarian law, more specifically in the crimes
of sexual violence and rape. See Payam Akhava et al., Contribution of the Ad
Hoc Tribunals to International Humanitarian Law, 13 AM. U. INT’L L. REV.
1509, 1509N40 (1998).
111. The Influence of the Nuremberg Trial on International Criminal Law,
ROBERT H. JACKSON CENTER https://www.roberthjackson.org/speech-and-writ-
ing/the-influence-of-the-nuremberg-trial-on-international-criminal-law/ (last
visited Jun. 2, 2017).
112. Overview, UNITEDNATIONS, http://legal.un.org/icc/general/overview.htm
(last visited Jan. 16, 2016). In the 1970s, the Khmer Rouge killed an estimated
two million civilians. Id. In countries like El Salvador, Liberia, and Mozam-
bique, there have been huge massacres of civilians, resulting in a genocide-
level number of deaths. See id.
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ward punishing violators of international humanitarian law, in-
cluding genocide and egregious violations of human rights.113
Shortly afterward, the U.N. General Assembly called upon the
International Law Commission114 to draft a proposal outlining
the establishment of an international criminal court.115 At the
fifty-second session, the U.N. General Assembly convened at the
United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on
the Establishment of an International Criminal Court in Rome,
Italy in June of 1>>? to 96Linali`e and adopt a Qonvention on the
establish/ent oL an international Qri/inal QourtZ’8116 This con-
ference ultimately led to the ratification of the Rome Statute and
the creation of the ICC.
1. Ratification of the Rome Statute and the Creation of the ICC
On July 17, 1998, 120 states117 ratified the Rome Statute,118
submitting to a permanent judicial body with jurisdictional
power to adjudicate violations of international humanitarian
law.119 The court is composed of four branches: the presidency,120
113. See id.
114. The U.N. General Assembly created the International Law Commission
to oversee and develop various aspects of international law, including interna-
tional humanitarian law. INT’L LAW COMM’N, http://legal.un.org/ilc/.
115. See id.
116. Id.
117. The United States has not signed the Rome Statute. President Bush’s
administration objected to the ICC’s inadequate checks and balances regarding
the court’s prosecutor and a lack of preventive mechanism to prevent politically
based prosecutions of U.S. political and military officials. Id. Countries, includ-
ing China, India, Pakistan, Indonesia, and Turkey, have not signed the Rome
Statute, while Egypt, Iran, Israel, and Russia have signed but not ratified the
statute. See The States Parties to the Rome Statute, supra note 30.
118. See Lucy Martinez, Prosecuting Terrorists at the International Criminal
Court: Possibilities and Problems, 34 RUTGERS L.J. 1, 62 (2002) (9The Rome
Statute provides for an International Criminal Court to be based in The Hague,
and has detailed provisions on; establishment of the Court; jurisdiction, admis-
sibility and applicable law; general principles of criminal law; composition and
administration of the Court; investigation and prosecution; trial; penalties; ap-
peal and revision; international cooperation and judicial assistance; enforce-
ment; assembly of states parties; and financing.8).
119. INT’L CRIMINAL COURT, UNDERSTANDING THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT, https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/pids/publications/uicceng.pdf.
120. The role of the presidency is to ensure efficiency and fluidity in the gen-
eral administration of the court. See The Presidency, INT’L CRIM. CT.,
https://www.icc-cpi.int/about/presidency (last visited May 24, 2017). The pres-
idency is composed of three judges, elected by their fellow judges for three-year
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the judges,121 the registry,122 and the OTP.123 The OTP is inde-
pendent from the ICC and does not require permission from
Member States before initiating an investigation.124 Its main re-
sponsibility is to conduct investigations and prosecute heinous
crimes, such as genocide and crimes against humanity.125
The ICC is funded through mandatory contributions by Mem-
ber States, corporations, and individuals, however, it can only
exercise its jurisdiction when a Member State is unable or un-
willing to investigate a matter.126 This means that a Member
State has primary jurisdiction, and therefore, the ICC can only
establish its jurisdiction where a Member State fails to carry out
a good faith investigation or prosecution of the violation, which
in essence means that the ICC will be barred from establishing
jurisdiction on a matter once a Member State meets its burden
of showing a good faith investigation.127 Moreover, the Rome
Statute does not provide for penalties when a Member State re-
terms. See id. The current president is Silvia Alejandra Fernandez De Gur-
mendi from Argentina. Id. The first vice president is Joyce Aluoch from Kenya,
and the second vice president is Kuniko Ozaki from Japan. Id.
121. See Judicial Divisions, INT’L CRIM. CT., https://www.icc-cpi.int/about/ju-
dicial-divisions (last visited May 24, 2017) (noting that the judicial division is
composed of eighteen judges divided into the pre-trial division, the trial divi-
sion, and the appeals division, and that each division of judges is responsible
for conducting different stages of the trial).
122. See Registry, INT’L CRIM. CT., https://www.icc-cpi.int/about/registry (last
visited May 24, 2017) (noting that the registry handles the nonjudicial admin-
istrative duties of the court).
123. Office of the Prosecutor, INT’L CRIM. CT., https://www.icc-
cpi.int/about/otp (last visited May 24, 2017)(describing that the office of the
prosecutor receives referrals on crimes that fall within the jurisdiction of the
ICC for further examination before a trial can be held and whose current pros-
ecutor is Fatou Bensouda, who was elected for a nine-year term).
124. See id.
125. See id.
126. All state parties to the Rome Statute, however, have an obligation to
cooperate with all ICC arrest warrants. Id. at 19; see also What does the Inter-
national Criminal Court do?, BBC NEWS (June 25, 2015),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-11809908 (noting that the court does not pos-
sess retrospective jurisdiction, it can only prosecute crimes committed after the
ratification of the Rome Statute).
127. See id.
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fuses to cooperate with an ICC investigation or honor a war-
rant,128 thus failing to provide a deterrent for Member States
who Qhoose to ignore the U!!’s de/andsZ129
The ICC hears cases on violations of international humanitar-
ian law committed by individuals, which include government
and military officials and heads of states.130 In order to hear a
case, the court can only exercise jurisdiction over crimes that oc-
curred in a contracting state to the Rome Statute or was com-
mitted by a citizen of a signatory state.131Moreover, the ICC can-
not prosecute a crime for which a signatory state has already
initiated judicial action.132 Only if these requirements are satis-
fied can the ICC exercise jurisdiction in one of the enumerated
ways listed in the Rome Statute.133
EZ U!!’s Unability to <uell "oHo Hara/
According to Human Rights WatQh, 9while the U!! is not re[
sponsible for international criminal accountability, its daunting
mandate and world-wide reach have made its flaws more visi-
bleZ8134 Coupled with the negative backlash it has received from
African countries, the ICC remains an ineffective mechanism to
end the impunity in Nigeria because of its inefficient investiga-
tion process in trying to prosecute violations of international hu-
manitarian law.
128. See Gwen P. Barnes, International Criminal Court’s Ineffective Enforce-
ment Mechanisms: The Indictment of President Omar Al Bashir, 34 FORDHAM
INT’L L.J. 1584, 1588N609 (2011).
129. See id.
130. See Olympia Bekou & Robert Cryer, The International Criminal Court
and Universal Jurisdiction: A Close Encounter?, 56 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 49
(2007) (describing the ICC’s jurisdiction over government officials as well as
individuals).
131. See Rome Statute, supra note 30, art. 11N14; see also Dapo Akande, The
Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court over Nationals of Non-Parties:
Legal Basis and Limits in the International Criminal Court, 1 J. INT’L CRIM.
JUST. 618, 622N25 (2003).
132. See Rome Statute, supra note 30, art. 17; see also Barnes, supra note
128.
133. See Rome Statute, supra note 30, arts. 13N15 (explaining that U.N.
Member States and the U.N. Security Council may refer crimes to the ICC
Prosecutor, or the ICC prosecutor may decide to initiate an investigation on
his or her own); see also Barnes, supra note 128 (describing the ICC’s lack of
power because of its inability to capture president Omar al-Bashir).
134. International Criminal Court, HUM. RTS. WATCH,
https://www.hrw.org/topic/international-justice/international-criminal-court.
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One of the major reasons why the ICC has been unsuccessful
in adjudicating disputes is the lingering belief that the ICC is
biased against African states because thus far, it has primarily
investigated only African-related matters.135 Specifically, the
OTP has investigated approximately thirty-nine cases since its
creation, of which, thirty-eight have been related to violations
occurring in Africa or by African individuals of ICC Member
States.136 Consequently, three former African Member StatesK
South Africa, Burundi, and GambiaKhave all withdrawn from
the ICC.137 This animosity has weakened the U!!’s legiti/aQy,
which is significant because it relies on Member States to en-
force its arrest warrants.138 Animosity with African states has
thus weakened its ability to capture Boko Haram members on
the African continent.
In addition, the ICC is ill-equipped to prosecute Boko Haram
members because of its inefficient spending and perceived lack
of legitimacy.139 According to Forbes, the ICC spent over $1 bil-
lion USD and thus far has only secured two convictions since it
came into force.140
The U!!’s ineLLeQtiveness in prosecuting humanitarian viola-
tions is best exemplified by its inability to capture the president
of Sudan, Omar al-Bashir.141 On July 14, 2008, the ICC Prosecu-
tor, Luis Moreno-Ocampo, issued an arrest warrant for Presi-
dent al-Bashir for his role in carrying out genocide in Darfur,
Sudan and repeated violations of international humanitarian
law142 and found that there was credible evidence to bring al-
135. Allison Simon, African Revolt Threatens International Criminal Court’s
Legitimacy, GUARDIAN (Oct. 27, 2016), https://www.theguard-
ian.com/law/2016/oct/27/african-revolt-international-criminal-court-gambia.
136. See id.
137. See id.
138. See id.
139. See David Davenport, International Criminal Court: 12 Years, $1 Bil-
lion, 2 Convictions, FORBES (Mar. 12, 2014), https://www.forbes.com/sites/da-
viddavenport/2014/03/12/international-criminal-court-12-years-1-billion-2-
convictions-2/#db0a04c24053.
140. Id.
141. See Prosecutor v. Al Bashir, ICC-02/05-01/09, Warrant of Arrest Against
for Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir (Mar. 4, 2009) (noting that amongst al-
Bashir’s charges were five counts of crimes against humanity, two counts of
war crimes, and one count for genocide).
142. Id. at 3.
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Bashir to trial.143 While there were several opportunities to de-
tain President al-Bashir, the most notable occurred when he vis-
ited two signatory countries to the Rome StatuteKChad and
Kenya.144 Both countries, refused to arrest him, however, be-
cause they did not want to disrupt their relations with Sudan,145
and consequently the warrant for President al-Bashir remained
outstanding.146 As evident from the al-Bashir catastrophe, it is
unlikely that the ICC would be able to prosecute hundreds of
Boko Haram members. As a result, a criminal tribunal would be
more effective in prosecuting Boko Haram members, as tribu-
nals, such as the ICTY and the ICTR, have successfully prose-
cuted hundreds of suspects in the past and provide a blueprint
for how to prosecute individuals who commit international
crimes.
3. International Response to Boko Haram
On several occasions, the U.N. Security Council, including the
U.N. Secretary-General147 and the president,148 have issued
143. See generally id.
144. See Prosecutor v. Al Bashir, ICC-02/05-01/09, Decision Informing the
United Nations Security Council and the Assembly of the States Parties to the
Rome Statute About Omar Al-Bashir’s Recent Visit to the Republic of Chad
(Aug. 27, 2010).
145. See Julian Borger, Commonwealth Chief Admonished by ICC over ‘War
Crimes’ Remarks, GUARDIAN (Oct. 27, 2010), http://www.theguard-
ian.com/world/2010/oct/27/commonwealth-international-criminal-court-
bashir.
146. See id.
147. See Ban Urges Global Community to ‘Never Forget’ Nigerian Girls on
Anniversary of Abduction, UNITED NATIONS NEWS CENT. (Apr. 14, 2015),
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=50568#.VpcWPDY4mRs (de-
scribing how U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon demanded the immediate
release of approximately 276 schoolgirls from Chibok, Nigeria on the one-year
anniversary of their abduction, where they were kidnapped as a part of a ter-
rorist raid of a school in April 2014). Ki-moon proclaimed: 9Going to school
should not have to be an act of bravery.8 Id.
148. Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Presidential State-
ment Condemns Boko Haram Attacks, Supports Joint Strategy to Combat Ter-
rorist Group’s Threats, U.N. Press Release SC/11983 (July 28, 2015) (noting
that Council President, Gerard Jacobus van Bohemen of New Zealand, urged
the international community not to associate Boko Haram with 9any religion,
nationality, or civilization8).
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statements condemning Boko Haram for its continuous viola-
tions of international humanitarian law.149 The U.N. Security
Council indicated that it would consider all courses of action
against the group and has already imposed an arms embargo on
the group.150
On September 29, 2015, the U.N. High Commissioner issued a
report on the human rights violations committed by Boko Haram
and concluded that the mass killings, abductions, rape, and
other forms of violence violated international humanitarian
law.151 The U.N. High Commissioner recommended a thorough
investigation and called for the prompt prosecution of Boko Ha-
ram members.152 It also called on the international community
to provide aid to Nigerian victims and to strengthen the U.N.
counterterrorism unit in an attempt to eradicate the terror
group; however, this attempt has proven to be futile, as Boko
Haram has continued to violate international humanitarian
law.153
Un addition to the 7ZRZ High !o//issioner’s report, the =TP
received over ninety complaints regarding the situation in Nige-
ria and subsequently began its preliminary examination into
Boko Haram on November 18, 2010.154 According to the OTP,
Boko Haram violated Articles 7 and 8 of the Rome Statute,
149. Security Council Condemns Boko Haram Violence, Backs Regional Ef-
forts to Counter Ongoing Attacks, UNITEDNATIONSNEWSCENT. (July 28, 2015),
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=51513#.Vpvf4DY4mRt (de-
scribing that, in January 2015, approximately eighty people, most of which
were children, were kidnapped in Cameroon in one of the largest kidnappings
by Boko Haram outside of the Nigerian border).
150. Statement by Ambassador Samantha Power, U.S. Permanent Repre-
sentative to the United Nations, on Security Council Action to Sanction Boko
Haram (May 22, 2014) (9By adding Boko Haram to the UN’s 1267 sanctions
list, the Security Council has helped close off important avenues of funding,
travel and weapons to Boko Haram, and shown global unity against their sav-
age actions.8).
151. Rep. of the U.N. High Comm’r for Human Rights on violations and
abuses committed by Boko Haram and the impact on human rights in the af-
fected countries, A/HRC/30/67 (2015).
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Nigeria ratified the Rome Statute on September 27, 2001. OFFICE OF THE
PROSECUTOR, REPORT ON PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION ACTIVITIES 44 (2015),
https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/otp/OTP-PE-rep-2015-Eng.pdf. Before an inves-
tigation may begin, the OTP conducts a preliminary investigation to determine
whether there is a sufficient basis to conduct a formal investigation. Id.
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which prohibit crimes against humanity.155Despite being in con-
tact with the Nigerian government, NGOs, and the United Na-
tions for six years, the OTP continues to gather evidence and
monitor the situation while the terror groups continue their
reign of terror.156
B. International Criminal Tribunals
The U.N. Security Council created international criminal tri-
bunals to address violations of international humanitarian law
during the breakup of Yugoslavia and the Rwandan genocide. In
both instances, the U.N. Security Council drafted resolutions
utilizing its authority under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter,157
which permits the U.N. Security Council to address threats to
world peace.158 These resolutions created tribunals to adjudicate
atrocities in the respective regions.159 With the cooperation of
U.N. Member States, they have successfully prosecuted hun-
dreds of perpetrators, and in doing so they have interpreted and
developed legal precedent in international humanitarian law.160
1. ICTY
In accordance with Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, in 1993,
the U.N. Security Council established the ICTY through Resolu-
tion 827,161 which gave the court jurisdiction over crimes against
humanity, war crimes, and genocide that occurred during the
breakup of the former Yugoslavia.162 The ICTY was vested with
155. See id. at 33, para. 128.
156. See id. at 51, para. 221.
157. Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter lays the foundation for dealing with
threats to peace and acts of aggression and states that the U.N. Security Coun-
cil shall decide what measures to take to restore international peace. See gen-
erally U.N. Charter arts. 39N51.
158. See generally id.
159. See International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY),
PROJECT ON INT’LCTS. & TRIBUNALS, http://www.pict-pcti.org/courts/ICTY.html
(last visited May 16, 2017).
160. See id.
161. See S.C. Res. 827 (May 25, 1993) (stating the circumstances in the for-
mer Yugoslavia required the creation of an ad hoc tribunal to prosecute per-
sons responsible for violations of international humanitarian law).
162. See About, supra note 40.
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primary jurisdiction over national judiciaries of the former Yu-
goslavia.163 Its main objectives included deterring future crimes
and bringing justice to victims.164
The conflict in the former Yugoslavia entailed a battle between
former republics of Yugoslavia.165 After the end of World War II,
the Republic of Yugoslavia consisted of the republics of Bosnia,
Croatia, Serbia, Montenegro, Macedonia, and Slovenia, as well
as the provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina.166 For years, the
leader of Yugoslavia, Josip Tito, followed Marxist ideology, sup-
pressing ethnic minorities and conflicts amongst Yugoslav re-
publics.167 Following the death of Tito in 1980, Yugoslavia spi-
raled into economic depression and government corruption.168
"y the late F>?Xs, eatre/ist :erbian leader, :lobodan Milo)evi',
rose to power and introduQed a 9:erbian nationalist agenda8 in
Yugoslavia, which caused tension amongst the non-Serbian re-
publics because the agenda made them feel inferior.169
Due to the Serbian agenda, in 1991, Croatia and Slovenia in-
tended to secede from Yugoslavia but faced threats by the prime
minister of Yugoslavia, Ante Markovic, who stated that the fed-
eral govern/ent would Qounter their seQession 9by all /eans8
because Yugoslavia wanted to maintain control over all of the
republics.170 Soon after, Croatia and Slovenia declared independ-
ence, and on June 27, 1991, the Yugoslavian army attacked the
states, which resulted in mass casualties.171
Backed by the Yugoslavian army, the Serbs raided towns and
villages and subjected Muslim and Croatian civilians to contin-
uous gun fire and explosives.172 The Serbs carried out ethnic
163. See id.
164. See id.
165. See Lilian A. Barria & Steven D. Roper, How Effective are International
Criminal Tribunals? An Analysis of the ICTY and the ICTR, 9 INT’L J. HUM.
RTS. 349, 350N57 (2005).
166. See Edina Slomic, When Skeletons Come Out of the Closet: Implications
of the Bosnian Genocide Decision for Serbia’s Eventual EU Accession, 37 GA. J.
INT’L&COMP. L. 621, 628N36 (2009).
167. See id.
168. See id.
169. See id.
170. See id.
171. See id.
172. See id.
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cleansing to the point where only a few thousand Muslims re-
mained in Serbian towns.173 Moreover, the Serbs also utilized
detention camps, where over six thousand Bosnian Muslims
were held Qaptive, and :erbian guards would 9regularly and
openly Hill, rape, torture, or dhu/iliate the/cZ8174
In each of these confrontations, there were mass casualties.175
During the Croatian conflict, approximately twenty thousand
people died and over four hundred thousand civilians were dis-
placed from their homes.176 Soon after in the Bosnian conflict, an
estimated two hundred thousand people died and over two mil-
lion civilians became refugees.177
In 1992, the U.N. Security Council created a Commission of
Experts to investigate the situation in the Former Yugoslavia
and report on whether there were violations of humanitarian
law.178 Shortly after the conflicts in Bosnia and Herzegovina be-
tween 1992 and 1993, the U.N. Security Council adopted a reso-
lution for the U.N. Secretary General to submit a report detail-
ing a proposal on how to create a tribunal, and within 100 days,
the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 827, which re-
sulted in the creation of the ICTY.179
Established under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, the U.N.
Security Council created the tribunal to restore international
peace and security.180 It was required to act independently of
recommendations by any political party and the U.N. Security
Council.181 Although its creation was opposed by the Republic of
Yugoslavia, its establishment through a U.N. Security Council
resolution meant that it was imposed on all parties, and a lack
of cooperation by a party allowed the U.N. Security Council to
impose sanctions on the noncompliant state.182
The tribunal’s Qreation under ;esolution ?E@ also restriQted
the ;epubliQ oL eugoslavia’s national sovereigntyZ183 The tribu-
nal statute stated that it would have primary jurisdiction over
173. See Slomic, supra note 166.
174. See id.
175. See id.
176. See id.
177. See id.
178. See id.
179. See id.
180. See Slomic, supra note 166.
181. See id.
182. See id.
183. See id.
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national jurisdiction, allowing it to take over a national investi-
gation whenever the tribunal’s proseQutor Lelt it was plausi[
ble.184 Moreover, double jeopardy did not apply, so if the tribunal
was unsatisfied with a national trial it could repeat the trial.185
Thus, the establishment of the ICTY represented a modern ad-
vancement of international jurisprudence in that it interpreted
ambiguous international treaties and developed legal precedent
pertaining to international humanitarian law.186
2. ICTR
In 1994, the U.N. Security Council established the ICTR to ad-
dress the atrocities committed during the genocide in Rwanda.187
On April 6, 1994, an airplane carrying the presidents of Burundi
and Rwanda was shot down in the capital of Rwanda, Kigali.188
Although blame for the attack was never determined, ethnic ten-
sions broHe out between ;wanda’s two biggest ethniQ groups: the
Hutus and the Tutsis, which stemmed from years of class jeal-
ousy as Tutsis are perceived to be wealthier than Hutus.189 Less
than four months after the plane crash, approximately eight
hundred thousand Tutsis were killed in Rwanda.190 The geno-
cide in Rwanda left its legal system in shambles, as most of
;wanda’s Judges were /urdered and its Qourts destroyedZ191 As
a result, the U.N. Secretary-General urged the U.N. Security
Council to establish a tribunal under Chapter VII of the U.N.
Charter.192 In November 1994, the U.N. Security Council
adopted Resolution 955,193 which allowed the ICTR to prosecute
perpetrators responsible for genocide and other odious crimes
committed in Rwanda and other neighboring regions.194 With
184. See id.
185. See id.
186. See id.
187. See Barria & Roper, supra note 165, at 152N57.
188. See id.
189. See id.
190. See id.
191. See generally Paul J. Magnarella, Expanding the Frontiers of Humani-
tarian Law: The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 9 FLA. J. INT’L
L. 421 (1994).
192. See Frank Dame, The Effect of International Criminal Tribunals on Ju-
dicial Culture, 24 MICH. ST. J. INT’L L. REV. 213, 237 (2005).
193. See S.C. Res. 955 (Nov. 8, 1994).
194. The ICTR was given broad jurisdiction over neighboring regions in an-
ticipation that fugitives would migrate from Rwanda to allude jurisdiction. See
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the support of U.N. Member States, the ICTR effectively cap-
tured several high-ranking government and military officials
and further developed legal precedent in international humani-
tarian law by codifying systemic rape and the usage of media to
incite violence as crimes against humanity .195
3. Prosecutorial Impact of the ICTY and ICTR
Both the ICTY and the ICTR were created to be ad hoc through
U.N. Security Council resolutions, and both had jurisdiction over
all perpetrators of a specific conflict in a specific region.196 These
tribunals have displayed the strength of international account-
ability and the consequences of violating international law, in-
cluding the prosecution of high-profiled political leaders.197
Moreover, the tribunals were able to seek justice for the millions
of individuals affected by the conflicts, either directly or indi-
rectly.198
In addition, both the ICTY and the ICTR have strengthened
the rule of law internationally by showing countries how to ad-
dress war crimes and how to prosecute perpetrators.199 For ex-
a/ple, the U!T;’s proseQution oL Lor/er ;wandan /ayor, Tean-
Paul Akayesu, established an international precedent when it
ruled that rape committed during the Rwandan war constituted
crimes against humanity.200 The tribunals have also played a
significant role in rebuilding the infrastructure in post conflict
states and developing a justice-oriented culture in society.201 For
example, the ICTY developed a verified factual record of the
Dame, supra note 192. Oddly enough, the only dissenting vote for the passage
of the tribunal was Rwanda. Rwanda raised several objections. Most notably,
the Rwandan government wanted the tribunal to be situated in Rwanda (the
ICTR is located in Tanzania), it wanted to grant the ICTR the ability to issue
the death penalty, and wanted the ICTR to have retroactive jurisdiction to
prosecute earlier crimes. In the end, however, Rwanda agreed to implement
the ICTR. See Bernard Muna, Navanethem Pillay & Theogene Rudasingwa,
The Rwanda Tribunal and its Relationship to National Trials in Rwanda, 13
AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1469 (1998).
195. See id.
196. Ivan Simonovic, The Role of the ICTY in the Development of Interna-
tional Criminal Adjudication, 23 FORDHAM INT’L L. J. 440 (1999).
197. See id.
198. See id.
199. See id.
200. See id.
201. See id.
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events that took place in the former Yugoslavia, which were once
debatable and contributed to peace in the region.202 As a result,
both tribunals have left a positive impact on the development of
international law.
III. HOW SHOULD THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY ADDRESS
BOKOHARAM’S REIGN OF TERROR IN AFRICA?
The ICC has been tasked with prosecuting humanitarian
atrocities worldwide.203 In regards to Boko Haram, the ICC Pros-
eQutor, Watou "ensouda, issued a state/ent saying: 9!ri/es
committed by [Boko Haram] . . . must be thoroughly and impar-
tially investigated and proseQuted dby the U!!cZ8204 Unfortu-
nately, the inefficiencies of the ICC, coupled with the perception
that the U!! is 9anti-#LriQan,8 /aHes it evident that these hu[
manitarian crimes must be investigated and prosecuted by an
alternative judicial body: an ad hoc tribunal.205
The U.N. Security Council must create an ad hoc tribunal in
Nigeria to stabilize Western Africa. To bring justice to African
families affected by Boko Haram, a coalition of U.N. Member
States is needed to effectively halt the terror group’s attaQHsZ
Such an effort should take place in two stages. First, U.N. Mem-
ber State agencies must work with NGOs and advocacy groups
to acknowledge the terror in Nigeria and develop an effective so-
cial media campaign that will advocate for an international re-
sponse. Second, the U.N. Security Council must adopt a resolu-
tion to establish a tribunal in Nigeria, where U.N. Member
States would participate in investigations, prosecutions, and the
enforcement of its judgments, which is required under the U.N.
Charter. This two-step process will ensure that a unified judicial
body will have sufficient resources to prosecute Boko Haram
members and bring justice to the region.
202. See id.
203. See id.
204. Id.
205. The ICC is perceived to be 9anti-African8 because its investigations have
focused solely on African countries and the defendants have been primarily
African. See generally Simon Allison, Is There an African Alternative to the In-
ternational Criminal Court, DAILYMAVERICK (Oct. 15, 2013), https://www.dai-
lymaverick.co.za/article/2013-10-15-is-there-an-african-alternative-to-the-in-
ternational-criminal-court/#.WKKQ7xjMwy4. African leaders also believe that
there are racial biases amongst the officials in the ICC. See id.
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A. Step One: Raising Awareness of Boko Haram Crimes
To bring justice to perpetrators responsible for violations of in-
ternational humanitarian law, NGOs need to first raise social
awareness about the heinous acts committed by Boko Haram. In
the era of social media, it is relatively easy to cultivate a media
campaign and raise worldwide public awareness.206 While it is
true that a 9hashtag8 alone Qannot proseQute Qri/inals, soQial
media is an effective tool to raise awareness and educate the
general population, who may then join the movement and help
increase the political pressure on politicians to act.207 In fact, his-
tory has shown the positive effects of successful media cam-
paigns, inQluding 90SonyEXFE8 and 90"oston:trongZ8208
Social media has the power to spread the message of the sor-
rows of those affected by Boko Haram. For example, in early
2014, social media raised awareness for the kidnapping of the
schoolgirls in Chibok, Nigeria.209 The social media phenomenon,
206. See generally Steve Olensi, The 3 Best Social Media Campaigns of 2015
(So Far), FORBES (Aug. 21, 2015), https://www.forbes.com/sites/steveolen-
ski/2015/08/21/the-3-best-social-media-campaigns-of-2015-so-
far/#4c2d5cf52dad.
207. See generally Megan Gibson, Can a Social Media Campaign Really
#BringBackOurGirls?, TIME (May 7, 2014), http://time.com/90693/bring-
backourgirls-nigeria-boko-haram/.
208. Erin Skarda,What You Need to Know About the 5 Most Successful Social
Media Campaigns for Social Change, NATIONSWELL (Sept. 16, 2014), http://na-
tionswell.com/social-media-campaigns-successful-at-change/.
209. See Suzanne Franks, #BringBackOurGirls: The Verdict, GUARDIAN
(June 3, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/global-development-profession-
als-network/2014/jun/03/bringbackourgirls-nigeria-media-communications.
Nigerians expected the relative silence surrounding the kidnapping of the
schoolgirls. For the most part, the story was largely ignored. In fact, most of
the coverage came after the #bringbackourgirls was created. Pundits compared
the media coverage of the Chibok school girls to a hypothetical kidnapping of
school girls in the United Kingdom:
Imagine if a single teenage girl was abducted from her board-
ing school dormitory in the UK. There would have been a . . .
media frenzy as soon as the news broke. . . . The comparative
silence surrounding the original kidnapping of hundreds of
girls from Chibok, in north-eastern Nigeria, might have
seemed surprising, except that it happened in Africa. As a
consequence, . . . the story was ignored or just told in a cur-
sory and often inaccurate way. . . . Eight days after the ab-
duction, a lawyer in Nigeria created the hashtag #bring-
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90bringourgirlsbaQH,8 inQreased publiQ awareness, LorQed the Ri[
gerian government to act, and caused other governments to re-
act.210 The viral phenomena prompted protests within Nigeria
and around the world and inspired lobbyists to urge politicians
to send military and negotiation officials to aid Nigeria.211 With-
out this campaign, the horrific kidnappings would have received
minimal coverage, if any, and the Nigerian government would
not have felt pressured to take greater action.212
Aside from social media, NGOs have worked diligently to end
the violent and discriminatory policies rooted in Nigerian soci-
ety. For example, Human Rights Watch defends the rights of
people worldwide and conducts an annual report on key human
rights issues, inQluding "oHo Hara/’s heinous aQts inRigeriaZ213
Another prominent NGO, Put Nigeria First, has worked dili-
gently to support Nigerian soldiers in their battle against Boko
Haram.214 The organization has worked to support widows and
orphans of Nigerian soldiers who battled Boko Haram.215 The
NGO has also targeted Nigerian problems of ethnic bigotry and
backourgirls to express the growing anger at the woeful gov-
ernment response. Over the next 10 days, the twitter band-
wagon gained momentum, soon passing a million tweets.
Id.
210. Id. (noting that numerous celebrities participated in the movement, in-
cludingMichelle Obama, Nobel Peace Prize winner, Malala Yousafzai, and Hil-
lary Clinton).
211. See Gibson, supra note 207.
212. See Charlotte Alter, How We Failed the Lost Girls Kidnapped by Boko
Haram, TIME (May 2, 2014), http://time.com/84414/how-we-failed-the-lost-
girls-kidnapped-by-boko-haram (9The kidnapping [of the schoolgirls] was men-
tioned for the first time on American TV on May 1, more than two weeks after
the girls were abducted. . . . The story never made the front page of the national
edition of the New York Times. CNN has had a bit more coverage, but nothing
approaching the coverage of the missing Malaysia Airlines plane. . . . By con-
trast, when the Malaysia Airlines jet disappeared March 8, the story was the
lead story on all NBC, ABC, and CBS news shows for eleven weekdays
straight.8).
213. In its 2015 report, Human Rights Watch highlighted Boko Haram, the
Nigerian government, and the Nigerian military as key human rights issues
in Nigeria. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT 2015: EVENTS OF 2014,
at 401N07 (2015), https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/wr2015_web.pdf.
214. See Ehi Ekhator, Boko Haram: NGO Drums Up Support for Nigerian
Soldiers, NAIJA CENT. NEWS (July 1, 2014), http://www.naijacen-
ter.com/news/boko-haram-ngo-drums-support-nigerian-soldiers/.
215. See id.
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religious tensions with patriotiQ progra/s Qalled 9=peration
Wlag Wlying8 and 9=ur #nthe/, =ur Prayer8 to unify the coun-
try.216 Working in tandem, these NGOs should be able to raise
awareness and commit greater resources to Boko Haram-af-
fected areas.
It is also important for NGOs to work with government agen-
cies to bring attention to Boko Haram and the destruction it has
caused. Commendably, the U.S. Agency for International Devel-
opment (USAID), a U.S. government agency, has supported an
array of humanitarian and developmental programs in Northern
Nigeria, which aim to increase food supply and provide other es-
sentials for civilians.217 USAID has already founded the Nigeria
Regional Transition Initiative (NRTI), which works to improve
the social, economic, and political conditions in Nigeria.218 The
NRTI has worked with local communities in Nigeria to counter
terrorism,219 including helping launch a radio program in North-
east Nigeria, sponsoring team-oriented activities for kids, and
developing the infrastructure of government-neglected cities.220
With the infrastructure already established in Nigeria, the
NRTI would be able to easily transition its efforts to the Boko
Hara/ proble/Z Wirst, given 7:#Uf and the R;TU’s La/iliarity
with the situation in Nigeria, they should create a campaign,
which would include individuals from NGOs, grassroots groups,
and members of the general public, to spread awareness about
Boko Haram atrocities and a call for justice. According to Nich-
olas Rasmussen, director of the National Counterterrorism Cen-
ter,221 9dpceople who are attraQted to dterroris/c don’t go to the
216. NGO Decries Use of Religion as Weapon of Terror, NIGERIANOBSERVER,
https://nigerianobservernews.com/01072014/01072014/news/news27.html
(last visited Jan. 16, 2016) (describing the NGO’s goals, which include 9re-
awaken[ing], infus[ing] and sustain[ing] the patriotic spirit of Nigerians8 and
having a country where citizens act in accordance with putting Nigeria first).
217. The U.S. Agency for International Development works to eradicate ex-
treme poverty around the world. See Who We Are, U.S. AGENCY INT’L DEV.,
https://www.usaid.gov/who-we-are (last visited Jan. 16, 2016).
218. See id.
219. See id.
220. See Karen Attiah, Nigeria’s Worrisome Humanitarian Situation De-
mands More Attention, WASH. POST (Nov. 13, 2015), https://www.washing-
tonpost.com/blogs/post-partisan/wp/2015/11/13/nigerias-worrisome-humani-
tarian-situation-demands-more-attention/?utm_term=.497f612d59bd.
221. The National Counterterrorism Center is responsible for providing the
U.S. government with intelligence relating to counterterrorism analysis. Who
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government for their guidance . . . they [are more likely to be]
inLluenQed by peers or Qultural groupsZ8222 As a result, the cam-
paign should a/pliLy the narrative oL "oHo Hara/’s reign oL ter[
ror by sharing firsthand pictures and stories of those that have
suffered at the hands of Boko Haram to spread awareness of the
atrocities committed by the terror group.223 This campaign
should also Qhallenge "oHo Hara/’s version oL Usla/ by sharing
interpretations oL religious sQholars that reLute "oHo Hara/’s
messages, which would avoid alienating the Islamic commu-
nity.224 Another key element of this campaign would be to high-
light "oHo Hara/’s hypoQrisies, whiQh inQlude preaQhing about
peace and purity, while its fighters engage in sexual abuse and
slavery. Again, this campaign must call on government officials
to hold perpetrators accountable and bring justice to the victims.
Instead of trying to pinpoint potential extremists, a grass roots
campaign would effectively combat Boko Haram because it
would be able to spread antiradical messages through local es-
tablishments that are more closely connected to the youth than
the government.
B. Step Two: Create an Ad Hoc Tribunal in Nigeria
Over the years, NGOs have developed strong relationships
with U.N. Security Council members, including persuading the
U.N. Security Council to use information it has gathered and
meeting regularly with the international body.225 Most notably,
NGOs played an intricate role in the establishment of the ICTY
and ICTR by effectively lobbying government officials.226 In or-
der to persuade the U.N. Security Council to establish another
tribunal, NGOs must demonstrate to the U.N. Security Council
that Boko Haram threatens international peace and security,
We Are, NAT’L COUNTERTERRORISM CENT., https://www.nctc.gov (last visited
Mar. 30, 2017).
222. Adam Weinstein, Here’s How the US Should Fight ISIS with Social Me-
dia, WIRED (Mar. 12, 2015), https://www.wired.com/2015/03/heres-us-fight-
isis-social-media/.
223. See id.
224. See Jessica Stern & J. M. Berger, A 6-Point Plan to Defeat ISIS in the
Propaganda War, TIME (Mar. 30, 2015), http://time.com/3751659/a-6-point-
plan-to-defeat-isis-in-the-propaganda-war/.
225. See James Paul,NGOs and the Security Council,GLOBALPOL’YF. (2004),
https://www.globalpolicy.org/security-council/40406-ngos-and-the-security-
council.html.
226. See id.
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and that the inadequacies of the ICC prevent that forum from
being a realistic option for prosecuting Boko Haram members.227
After being convinced, the U.N. Security Council would need
to adopt a resolution under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter to
create an ad hoc tribunal in Nigeria to prosecute international
humanitarian crimes committed by Boko Haram members. Us-
ing the blueprint from the ICTY and ICTR,228 the U.N. Security
Council should incorporate their rules of procedure and evi-
dence, which have been developed and proven to be effective in
their two previous uses.229 Unlike ICC officials, the U.N. Secu-
rity Council would be able to order Member States to enforce in-
dictments and trial orders under its inherent enforcement pow-
ers vested in the U.N. Charter, which would give the tribunal
sufficient resources to capture and detain Boko Haram mem-
bers.230
In order to pass a resolution to establish a tribunal, the U.N.
Security Council would need to ask the U.N. Secretary-General
to establish a commission to report on the evidence of grave
breaches of international humanitarian law committed by Boko
Haram.231 Once established, the duration of the tribunal would
be based on when the U.N. Security-General believes the threat
to international peace would be resolved.
In the case of Boko Haram, an ad hoc tribunal would rely on
Member State militiasKwhich have played an active role in ar-
resting, providing prison facilities, and financial and material
assistance to such tribunals in the pastKto prosecute Boko Ha-
ram members.232 As a result, convicted Boko Haram members
would be subject to criminal sanctions in the tribunal detention
227. See id.
228. See id. This caused resentment by the locals because they were unable
to attend the trials and see justice being served. See id.
229. All Member States of the United Nations must comply with the tribu-
nal’s authority, which would avoid the issue of Nigerian consent. See Interna-
tional Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), supra note 159.
230. See id.
231. See Rome Statute, supra note 30, art. 53.
232. The ICTR prosecuted persons that were arrested in Tanzania, Came-
roon, Kenya, Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, Namibia, Togo, Zambia, Burkina Faso, Mali,
the Democratic Republic of Congo, South Africa, Belgium, Switzerland, the
Netherlands, and the United States. See International Co-operation With the
Tribunal, INT’L CRIM. TRIBUNAL RWANDA, http://ictr-archive09.library.cor-
nell.edu/ENGLISH/factsheets/6.html (last visited May 16, 2017).
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center located at the Hague.233 Larry D. Johnson, a professor and
former Deputy Legal Counsel for the United Nations, once said:
97ZRZ based Qri/inal tribunals show that when the Qonstellation
of the various factors and elements are right, a public order of
hu/an dignity Qan be aQhievedZ8234 In fact, criminal tribunals
with a narrow focus have shown to be an efficient mechanism in
prosecuting international crimes compared to the ICC.235 The
narrow focus of prosecuting Boko Haram members in Nigeria
would suffice for a tribunal in Nigeria.
In effect, the ICTY and ICTR were able to hold individuals ac-
countable for international humanitarian crimes, strengthen in-
ternational accountability, and rebuild in post conflict states.
Similarly, a tribunal established in Nigeria would have similar
effects because it would be based off the legal precedents estab-
lished by the ICTY and ICTR. With established legal precedent,
a tribunal in Nigeria would be using developed case law, rules,
and procedures, which have proven to work in the past.
CONCLUSION
The insurgency of Boko Haram has left more than one million
Nigerians displaced from their homes. While the ICC and the
Nigerian government mull over a response, the terror group con-
tinues to commit genocide, crimes against humanity, and rape
against the Rigerian peopleZ Un su/, the U!!’s ineLLiQient reQord
of trying cases, questionable legitimacy, and backlash from
Member States, makes it an ineffective mechanism for prosecut-
ing Boko Haram members. Instead, an ad hoc criminal tribunal
provides a more viable and effective option, given the track rec-
ords of the two previous tribunalsKthe ICTY and ICTR. In order
to establish a tribunal, the international community, including
NGOs and international state agencies, must dedicate resources
to promote a media campaign aimed at educating the general
publiQ about "oHo Hara/’s atroQities to prevent "oHo Hara/’s
further expansion. The U.N. Security Council must also pass a
resolution to create an ad hoc tribunal in Nigeria to prosecute
violations of international humanitarian law crimes committed
by Boko Haram members, which include crimes against human-
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Id.
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ity, genocide, and rape. Given the circumstances, the U.N. Secu-
rity Council has a prime opportunity to develop international
humanitarian law and provide justice to the victims of these vi-
cious crimes.
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